Use risk-based method to develop a foundation for quantitatively assessing the contribution of maintenance activities in offshore petroleum oil and gas industry by Shao, Hanchen
  
 
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
MASTER'S THESIS  
 
 
Study program/specialization: 
Offshore Technology 
 
 
Spring semester, 2009 
 
Open / Confidential 
 
 
Author: Hanchen Shao 
 
 
………………………………………… 
(signature author) 
 
Instructor: Associate Professor Tore Markeset, UiS 
 
Supervisor(s): Dr. Sukhvir Singh Panesar, Sørco 
 
 
 
Title of  Master's Thesis:  
 
Use Risk-based Method to Develop a Foundation for Quantitatively Assessing the Contribution of 
Maintenance activities in Offshore Petroleum Oil and Gas Industry  
 
ECTS:  
 
 
Subject headings: 
  
Industrial Asset Management 
 
 
 
 
         Pages: ………………… 
         + Attachments/other: ………… 
 
         Stavanger, ……………….. 
                                Date/year 
 
  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use Risk-based Method to Develop a Foundation for 
Quantitatively Assessing the Contribution of Maintenance 
activities in Offshore Petroleum Oil and Gas Industry 
 
 
 
 
Masters Thesis by 
 
Hanchen Shao 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Engineering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Industrial Asset Management 
Faculty of Science and Technology 
Department of Mechanical and Structural Engineering and Materials Science 
University of Stavanger 
15.06.2009 
 
 
 
  3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This thesis is submitted as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master degree 
at the University of Stavanger (UiS), Norway. The research work was carried out at the 
AGR EmiTeam and UiS in the period from February, 2009, to June, 2009.  
 
I wish to express my sincere thanks to my supervisors Associate Professor Tore Markeset 
from UiS and Dr. Sukhvir Singh Panesar from Sørco, for their thoughtful supervision, 
steady support, guidance, and support throughout the study as well as sailing me out of 
the turbulent times of confusion and bewilderment. 
 
I would also like to acknowledge the guidance and support by Ole Jørgen Melleby and 
Eivind Jåsund from AGR EmiTeam. 
 
I convey my sincere gratitude to all who helped me with the comments as well as 
suggestions to improve the quality of my work. 
 
I am especially grateful to Harald Flesland from AGR EmiTeam for his assistance and 
support. 
 
I would like to thank the AGR Emi Team and CIAM at the UiS, Norway for providing 
relevant documents and other facilities for conducting the research work. 
 
I would also like to thank all my family members and friends for their support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4 
ABSTRACT 
 
As the world market becomes more benefit-oriented, increasingly companies and 
organizations are becoming aware of the maintenance’s contribution to value generation, 
as well as its contribution to risk reduction. Maintenance is considered as an important 
business process that could contribute to overall profitability. However, many companies 
find it difficult to quantify contribution of maintenance in value creation and risk 
reduction. Therefore, these companies are not able to effectively plan maintenance 
management as well as decide resource allocation for maintenance activities.   
 
The aim of this research study is to suggest a methodology to quantitatively assess the 
contribution of maintenance activities in reducing overall risk with respect to HSE and 
ensuring production regularity. Such kind of quantitative assessment provides a valuable 
decision-making basis to the managers to appropriately plan maintenance activities and 
allocate optimal resources. 
 
In this thesis, a risk-based methodology is proposed to quantitatively assess the value of 
maintenance activities. The value of maintenance activities is expressed as the risk 
reduction values that could be achieved by performing a particular maintenance activity.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Risk value, Contribution of maintenance, maintenance cost, production 
regularity, maintenance management, fault, failure modes, etc. 
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NOTATION AND ABBREVIATION 
 
Fi                         Frequency of failures 
Pi                        Probability of accidents 
Ci                       Consequence of accidents 
CBM                  Condition based maintenance 
CED                   Cause and effect diagrams 
CFC                   Clean-up and fine cost of oil leakage 
CM                    Corrective maintenance 
CMM                 Corrective maintenance man-hours 
CMSP                Corrective maintenance spare parts 
DL                      Downtime loss 
ETA                   Event tree analysis 
FME(C)A          Failure mode effects (and critical) analysis 
FTA                   Fault tree analysis 
LO                     Lost oil cost 
MFTT               Mean function test time 
MTBF               Mean time between failures 
MTTR               Mean time to repair 
OREDA            Offshore Reliability Data 
OEM                 Original equipment manufacturer 
PdM                   Predictive maintenance 
PDL                   Production degradation loss 
PM                     Preventive maintenance 
QA                     Qualitative risk assessment 
QRA                   Quantified risk assessment 
RBD                   Reliability block diagrams 
RC                      Repair cost 
SQA                   Semi-quantitative assessment 
TBF                   Time between failures 
TBM                  Time based maintenance 
TTR                   Time to repair 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is aimed to introduce the background and the aim of this thesis. The 
contributions and limitations are also explained. 
 
1.1  Background 
Companies and organizations in all industries are increasingly becoming aware of the 
maintenance contribution to risk reduction as well as business success. Maintenance 
spending in many of the companies goes to up to 40% of the operating budgets. 
According to a study, in U.K. the maintenance spending of manufacturing companies is 
between 12 to 23% of the operating costs. In oil and gas industry in Norway, companies 
are increasingly realizing importance of maintenance. A large number of service 
companies have established that provide knowledge and technology based services to 
improve maintenance management effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
With the advances in technology, the Norwegian O&G industry is increasingly becoming 
dependant on advanced, complex and integrated machinery and equipment. This high 
complexity increases the interdependencies between different components, and brings 
more uncertainties to the system. In this case, even a small failure can lead to a 
catastrophic accident: injury, loss of life and uncountable loss of money. Recall the 
Pipeline Alfa accident, the whole accident only took place in 22 minutes, but caused 
death of 167 people. Such large accident was just initiated by a broken pump.  
 
Besides risk reduction, maintenance can generate value by reducing downtime, increasing 
equipment life, etc.. Some years ago, maintenance was and considered as a “Necessary 
evil”, and it was believed that “Nothing can be done to improve maintenance 
costs.”(Mobley, 1990) However, the development of modern maintenance techniques 
such as condition monitoring, computer based maintenance management changed the 
paradigm. Both the research results and the practical applications show that the 
successful maintenance programs can greatly improve the value generation by reducing 
the machine failures, reducing repair time, reducing spare parts costs, and increasing the 
machine life as well as productivity  
 
Even though there is a increased focus on maintenance management and almost 40% of 
the total costs are spent on maintenance in the O&G industry, the recent surveys 
indicated that one third of all maintenance costs is wasted as the result of unnecessary or 
improperly carried out maintenance (Mobley, 1990). In U.S.A, the result of ineffective 
maintenance management represents a loss of more than 60 billion dollars each year.  
1.2 Problem Description 
The main reason for the ineffective maintenance management is the lack of factual data 
that quantifies the actual need for repair or maintenance of plant machinery, equipment, 
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and system (Mobley, 1990). In the last decades, researchers and engineers never stop 
striving for collecting historical information, building up database, predicated on 
statistical trend data or finding method to measure the numerical value of every 
maintenance-related term. Thanks to their effort, we have many different kinds of 
database available now, such as OREDA, HSE report, etc. 
 
However, we still have not found a method to quantitatively assess the contribution of 
maintenance activities till now. Contribution of maintenance activities is the most 
intuitional indicator that can indicate value creation and risk reduction. As the world 
market becomes more benefit-oriented, we are more and more interested in finding out 
how we can quantify contribution of maintenance with respect to HSE and costs? How 
much risk is reduced due to effective and efficient maintenance management?  
1.3 Aim of the Research 
The purpose of the thesis is to study the foundation for quantitatively assessing the value 
of maintenance activities in order to reduce overall risk with respect to HSE and 
production regularity, as well as to suggest/propose ways to improve the value 
assessment of failure consequences. 
1.4  The Scope of Work 
The project shall look into the following: 
 
• Map existing knowledge. 
• Examine the risk analysis process  
• Use the FMECA analysis methodology to identify failure modes, failure mechanisms, 
failure effects and maintenance activities to mitigate the risk. 
• Quantify the change in risk if the maintenance activity is not performed. 
• Suggest improvements to maintenance management based on value assessment of 
maintenance. 
1.5  Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis include the following: 
 
1) A methodology to quantitatively assess the contribution of maintenance activities has 
been discussed in the thesis. This thesis suggests a possible foundation of how to 
quantify the contribution of maintenance in value creation and risk reduction. 
 
2) The process of how this methodology affects the maintenance management is 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
3) A description of how to apply this methodology in practice is given in the thesis. This 
thesis does not only focus on theoretical study, but also underline the importance in 
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practical applications. This thesis suggests some solutions in how to make the 
maintenance management more effective and cost efficient by using the methodology. 
1.6  Limitations 
The limitations of this thesis are: 
 
1) Limited equipments and failure modes have been considered in this thesis. 
2) The consequences we considered in this thesis are based on complete failure of a 
function. Consequences based on partial failure of equipment are not considered. 
3) Consequences related to economic and HSE are considered in this thesis. The 
other kinds of consequence are not considered. 
4) Data sample is from the Norwegian O&G industry. It does not cover all 
industries. 
1.7 Thesis outline 
The thesis is composite of 8 chapters. After the current introduction, the concept of 
maintenance and maintenance management is introduced in order to give the reader a 
comprehensive understanding of maintenance and maintenance management. After that, 
the methodology for quantitatively assessing the value of maintenance activities is 
established in Chapter 3, where the principle of the methodology, and describe the 
framework and process of quantitatively assessing the value of maintenance activities are 
described. In Chapter 4, we will do some theoretical knowledge preparation for the 
calculation of the value of maintenance. The following chapters are the data collection 
and calculation (Chapter 5) and case study (Chapter 6). Finally, the thesis ends with some 
discussion (Chapter 7) and suggestion for future research (Chapter 8). 
 
On the whole, the 8 chapters can be categorized into 4 parts in logic: Introduction Part, 
Preparatory Part, Methodology Research Part, and Discussion and Conclusion Part. The 
outline of the thesis is visualized in Figure 1.1.  
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Figure 1.1 Outline of the thesis 
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2 MAINTENANCE AND MAINTENANCE 
MANAGEMENT 
Before the studying of value of maintenance activities, a comprehensive understanding of 
maintenance and maintenance management is necessary. In this chapter, the concept of 
maintenance and maintenance management is introduced. 
2.1 Overview of Maintenance 
According to A. C. Márquez, the term of maintenance in the Oil and Gas industry can be 
defined as the following (EN 13306:2001, 2001): 
 
“Maintenance is the combination of all technical, administrative and managerial 
decisions and actions during the life cycle of an item intended to retain an item in, or 
restore it to a state of specified capability. Capability is the ability to perform a specific 
action within a range of performance levels.” 
 
No matter how the definition various, the aim of the maintenance is widely agreed by 
most of companies as to support the market and operational goals according to Wilson 
(1999), that is subsidies the previously described company goals and operational aspects. 
Lofsten (1999) states that it is of importance to realize that the maintenance function add 
value, although not as obviously as other departments and that it is an equally important 
link and other departments.  
 
Maintenance covers any activity carried out on an asset to repair equipment, or to ensure 
the asset continues to perform its intended functions. Maintenance includes all actions 
taken to prevent or reduce the consequences of failure. 
 
Another aim for the maintenance function is to secure the safety of the installation for the 
personnel. Nowadays there are also extensive regulations concerning safety and safety 
levels must often be approved by some licensed organization. Maintenance should also 
guard sustainable environmental status of the installation. It should keep emissions to 
designated (legal or policy based) levels. Assets should be maintained in order to extend 
their lifetime and maintenance experiences can be communicated to designers in order to 
improve forthcoming design solutions, in an environmental context. These considerations 
are separated from the operation of the installation, but equally important, and may have 
implications for the scope for process optimization. 
2.2 Types of maintenance 
Generally, maintenance activities can be classified into the following types: 
 
 Run-to-Failure Maintenance The basic logic of Run-to-Failure maintenance is to 
allow the equipment to run to failure and only do repair or replace activities when 
obvious problems occur. This maintenance management method has been a major 
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part of plant maintenance operations since the first manufacturing plant was built, 
and on the surface sounds reasonable (Mobley & Knoxville, 2001). Run-to-failure is 
a reactive maintenance technique, no maintenance activity is taken before the 
equipment fails. This kind of maintenance works well if the equipment is very cheap 
and its shutdowns don’t affect production. The advantage is that no money is 
invested in the maintenance activities before failure occurs.  
 
 Preventive Maintenance Preventive maintenance is a schedule of planned 
maintenance actions aimed at the prevention of breakdowns and failures. Its main 
goal is to prevent the failure before it actually occurs. Preventive maintenance 
activities include partial or complete overhauls at specified periods, oil changes, 
lubrication and so on. The ideal preventive maintenance program would prevent all 
equipment failure before it occurs. Preventive maintenance is considered to be a kind 
of time-driven maintenance management; the maintenance scheduling has been and, 
in many instances, is predicated on statistical trend data or on the actual failure of 
plant equipment (Mobley & Knoxville, 2001). The premise of the PM is that all the 
machines will degrade with the time elapse, the probability of failures follows the 
Bathtub curve shown in the following figure: in the initial stage of the equipment life 
cycle, the probability of failure is relatively low for an extended period of time; in 
the normal stage, the probability of failure increases sharply with elapsed time.  This 
PM method can greatly expand the life of equipment, but the disadvantage of  the 
time-based maintenance is labor intensive, ineffective in identifying problems that 
develop between scheduled inspections, and is not cost-effective.  
 
 Predictive Maintenance Predictive maintenance techniques help determine the 
condition of in-service equipment in order to predict when maintenance should be 
performed. This approach offers cost savings over routine or time-based preventive 
maintenance, because tasks are performed only when warranted. PdM is an 
condition-based maintenance management program, The using of condition 
monitoring techniques is the main character of PdM. Condition monitoring 
techniques include Vibration Measurement and Analysis, Infrared Thermography, 
Oil Analysis and Tribology, Ultrasonic, Motor Current Analysis, and etc.. When the 
failure event is diagnosed, corrective maintenance should be performed to prevent 
the failure deterioration. The ultimate goal of PdM is to perform maintenance at a 
scheduled point in time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and 
before the equipment loses optimum performance. This is in contrast to time- and/or 
operation count-based maintenance, where a piece of equipment gets maintained 
whether it needs it or not. 
 
Normally, the type of maintenance philosophy can be assigned by the criticality of 
equipments. The critical machines are usually maintained with the predictive and 
proactive techniques; the essential machines are usually assigned with preventive 
maintenance. In actual operations, a mix and match of techniques is applied with a prime 
intention of maximizing runtime lengths and reducing downtime and costs. The present 
day focus on continuous process plant pumps is to adopt a mix of predictive and 
Preventive Maintenance. 
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2.3 Maintenance Management 
Management process is a process of planning, leading and controlling the performance or 
execution of any type of activity through the deployment and manipulation of resources 
(human, financial, material, intellectual or intangible). One can also think of management 
functionally as the action of measuring a quantity on a regular basis and adjusting an 
initial plan and the actions taken to reach one’s intended goal (Márquez, 2007). 
Maintenance management can be therefore considered as the process of leading and 
directing the maintenance organization.  
 
The maintenance management can be defined as follows (EN 13306:2001, 2001): 
“All the activities of the management that determine the maintenance objectives or 
priorities (defined as targets assigned and accepted by the management and 
department), strategies (defined as a management method in order to achieve 
maintenance objectives), and responsibilities and implement them by means such as 
maintenance planning, maintenance control and supervision, and several improving 
methods including economical aspects in the organization. 
 
The Maintenance Management Cycle presented in figure 2.1 illustrates the management 
process resulting in (ideally) low expenses and high regularity (availability) and Safety, 
Health and Environmental (SHE) level by effective use of input resources. Every activity 
in the circle consists of a vast number of steps. The controlling and connecting force for 
these activities is the managerial activity. 
 
Resources                                                                                                               Outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Maintenance Management cycle (NPD, 1998) 
 
 Goals and requirements. Goals and requirements include the translation of 
previously described market and production objectives into maintenance goals and 
specification of requirements necessary to achieve them. It is also important to 
establish indicators to monitor these goals.  
 Maintenance program. The next phase is to develop maintenance programs and 
methods for the maintenance work such as RCM, RBI etc. 
 Planning. Maintenance program needs to be well planned in order to be able to 
execute the maintenance work efficiently. 
Execution Planning Maintenance 
program 
Goals & 
requirements 
Organization Costs 
Regularity Technical 
condition Resource 
needs  
Material 
HSE level 
Reporting Analysis Improvement 
measure 
Supporting 
documents 
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 Execution. The execution involves implementing planned maintenance programs, 
training activities and naturally the operative maintenance. Operational maintenance 
does not only include the actual work and information concerning it, but also the 
handling of different permissions, reporting guidelines and finally control of the jobs. 
 Reporting. In the reporting stage the mentioned guidelines come to use and different 
reports and trend developments are created, monitoring the maintenance work.  
 Analysis. These reports are the foundation for the analysis of the work done in order 
to answer what, why and which equipment questions used in evaluations.  
 Measuring improvement. Measuring improvement and comparing the measures to 
best case values is a way for continuous improvement.  (NPD, 1998) 
 
The input into this process is the organization and the design, competence and leadership 
in it. It also consists of the material (tools and spare parts) used and supplementary 
documentation such as technical documents and guidelines for work processes. Crucial 
for the support of these input factors is a functional CMMS. (NPD, 1998) 
 
It is also of great importance to establish a maintenance-management policy for the entire 
installation in order to visualize and communicate the maintenance strategy (Wilson, 
1999). This policy should be broken down into specified policies for every production 
line or section of the installation, with aid from the maintenance programs, in order to 
manage the maintenance work both in accordance with corporate goals and demands of 
different sections. Otherwise money and time may be wasted on unnecessary 
maintenance. 
The Benefits of Maintenance Management are as the following:  
 Low production unit cost Proper maintenance management can improve asset 
reliability; ensure the resources such as labor, materials, energy, and fixed costs are 
used efficiently minimize expenses. While a major component of these costs is fixed, 
increasing throughput will decrease the unit cost of production. Base labor cost will 
remain constant even when production throughput is increased; incremental cost for 
materials and energy is also reduced as volume increases. 
 
 Reduce maintenance costs Improved reliability results in lower maintenance costs. If 
the assets are not breaking down, a greater percentage of maintenance work can be 
performed in a planned and scheduled manner, which enables the workforce to be at 
least twice as efficient. Reducing these losses will also result in requirement of fewer 
spare parts, less overtime, and fewer contractors. All of these result in significant 
reductions in maintenance spending. It is not unusual for organizations to experience 
as much as a 50 percent reduction in maintenance cost as a result of moving from a 
reactive style of management to a proactive approach. 
 
 Better process stability.  Equipment breakdowns inevitably result in process unsets. 
It is difficult to have a stable, optimized process when the production equipment is 
constantly failing. This inevitably results in problems with final product quality. 
When reliability is improved, process variability is reduced, and statistical process 
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capability is increased. This results in the capability to have a more stable, 
predictable manufacturing process. 
 
 Expending Equipment life. Many organizations spend an excessive amount of capital 
funds to replace equipment that failed far earlier than it should have. If routine 
maintenance is continually deferred due to production demands or resource 
limitations, the organizations, the organization is in fact mortgaging the future value 
of the asset-taking the capital value from the future and spending it today. The end 
result is a wasted asset that must be replaced. The financial result is excessive write-
off expenses and a requirement for a constant infusion of new capital. 
 
 Reduce spare parts inventory. All organizations require some level of spare parts 
inventory to ensure the right parts will be available when needed. Reactive 
organizations typically find themselves carrying a large quantity of inventory 
because they cannot predict when the parts will be needed. This ties up working 
capital and results in excessive carrying costs. Organizations that take a proactive 
approach to reliability place a high value in knowing the condition of their assets. 
The need for parts is much more predictable. There are fewer “surprises”: more parts 
can be purchased on a just-in-time basis. Since the volume of inventory required is 
based to a large degree on usage, the fewer parts we use, the fewer we need to keep 
on hand. 
 
 Reduce overtime. Reactive organizations can never predict when a critical equipment 
failure will occur. Murphy’s Law typically applies; it will invariably happen at the 
most inconvenient time and will require craft resources to be called into the facility 
to correct the problem. To counter this reality, most reactive organizations have a 
large percentage of the maintenance workforce spread across all operating shifts “just 
in case” a failure occurs. In this situation, the equipment is in control, not 
management. Large amounts of overtime are experienced. In organizations that focus 
on reliability, breakdowns are much less common. A larger percentage of craft 
resources are on day shift where adequate staff supports is available to increase their 
productivity. Fewer resources are waiting for breakdowns to occur because 
equipment condition is known and early warning signs of distress are heeded. 
2.4 Maintenance-related Failures  
Maintenance-related failure means the failure which is caused by improper maintenance 
management. Maintenance-related failures could lead reliability problems, and will 
generate potential risks to systems. The maintenance-related failures owe to the following 
issues: 
 
 Improper maintenance. Most maintenance functions permit the crafts to determine 
how maintenance activities will be executed. As a result, many of these tasks are 
performed incorrectly and incompletely. The result is chronic reliability problem. 
 Poor planning. Too many maintenance functions have eliminated the planning and 
scheduling function. Instead, work requests are compiled, routed to the supervisors 
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and issued for execution without proper planning. As a result, critical activities are 
not executed in a timely manner or the procedures used are inadequate. 
 Failure to perform effective preventive maintenance tasks. Preventive maintenance, 
that is inspections, lubrication, calibrations, and adjustments must be performed in a 
timely manner to sustain reliable asset operation. Failure to adhere to these schedules 
and effective execution of these tasks result in reduced asset reliability. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodology for quantitatively 
assessing the value of maintenance activities. In this chapter, we will introduce the 
principle of the methodology, and describe the framework and process of quantitatively 
assessing the value of maintenance activities.  
 
For the purpose of methodology research, we define the value of maintenance activities 
as the following: The value of maintenance activity could be defined as its positive 
contribution to the system. It expresses the net benefit we can obtain from a maintenance 
activity. 
3.1 Overview of the methodology 
The purpose we use maintenance activities is to prevent the equipment failures. Once the 
maintenance activities are not performed, the failures will occur, and correspondingly is 
the risk to both the production and the safety. Furthermore, the value of risk is a term that 
we are able to quantitatively assess. Therefore, using the increasing value in risk if the 
maintenance activity is not done to assess the value of maintenance could be a good 
option.  
 
Based on this consideration, we can calculate the value of maintenance activity by the 
following equation: 
 
Value of maintenance activity= total saved risk value – total costs of maintenance  
 
In order to facilitate the calculation, in the equation we use the term of the total saved risk 
value instead of the increasing value of risk if a maintenance activity is not performed as 
the latter one is a negative number. The total saved risk value is positive, and it is equal to 
the increasing risk value if a maintenance activity is not performed in magnitude. It 
means all the risk values, no matter economical or HSE related, that can be saved by the 
maintenance activity. It is the positive contribution of a maintenance activity. On the 
other hand, the term total costs of maintenance represent the negative contribution of the 
maintenance activity. Therefore, when we use the first term minus the second one, it 
expresses the benefit we can get from the maintenance activity. That is the value of the 
maintenance activity. 
3.2 Philosophy of the methodology 
In order to comprehensively understand the philosophy of the methodology, we must 
firstly study what the failure is and how the maintenance activities work on failures.  
3.2.1 Failure and failure-related terms 
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“Failure” is the evil to industries. All the efforts the maintenance engineers done or going 
to do are aimed to prevent failures or mitigate the effects of failures. According to IEC50 
(191), the definition of failure is: “the termination of the ability of an item to perform a 
required function” (IEC50 (191)). Many people may have the confusions between failure 
and fault. From the difference between failure and fault, we can more clearly understand 
the definition of failure: failure is the performance deterioration process, it is an event 
that results the performance of equipment out of acceptable limits; fault is hence a state 
resulting from a failure. The figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between failure, fault 
and equipment performance. 
                                       
Figure 3.1 Failure development process diagram 
 
In order to have a better understanding of failure, some failure-related terms are defined 
here: 
                   
 
Figure 3.2 Illustration of failure-related terms 
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• Mean Down Time (MDT), is the period during which equipment is in the failed 
state (David J. Smith, 2001). 
• Mean Time To Fail (MTTF) is defined as: for a stated period in the life of an 
item the ratio of cumulative time to the total number of failures.  
• Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) is defined: for a stated period in the life 
of an item the mean value of the length of time between consecutive failures, computed 
as the ratio of the total cumulative observed time to the total number of failures (David J. 
Smith, 2001). The difference between MTTF and MTBF is that MTTF is applied to items 
that are not repaired, such as bearings and transistors, and MTBF to items which are 
repaired. The MTBF excludes the down time.  
• Failure rate is defined as: for a stated period in the life of an item, the ratio of the 
total number of failures to the total cumulative observed time. Usually, λ is used to 
express failure rate, and λ= n/T, where n is the number of failures in the time period of T. 
If the failure rate is constant, we can get the equation that λ=1/MTBF. 
3.2.2 Maintenance versus failure 
Failure is nature. Many factors such as wearing, improper operation and other known or 
unknown factors can result in failures. With the time elapsing, failures will occur on 
equipments, and make the equipment’s performance decline. On the contrary, 
maintenance activities can prevent the equipment from failures. The function of 
maintenance is to repair equipment, or to ensure the asset continues to perform its 
intended functions, as well as to prevent or reduce the consequences of failure. Without 
maintenance, failures will go on determinating, and finally make the equipment totally 
fail.  
 
Different types of maintenance actions have different effectiveness on preventing failures. 
In run-to-Failure maintenance, the equipment is allowed to run to failure, and repair or 
replace activities are only done when obvious problems occur.  
                 
Figure 3.3 Illustration of run-to-failure maintenance 
 
Run-to-failure maintenance is a passive maintenance management. Studies show that, it 
is the most expensive method of maintenance management, the major expenses 
Downtime 
Performance 
Time, T 
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associated with this type of maintenance management are (R. Keith Mobley, Knoxville, 
2001): 
o high spare parts inventory cost  
o high overtime labor costs 
o high machine downtime and low production availability 
 
Preventive maintenance is a time-driven maintenance management. In PM, the 
maintenance actions are done periodically to prevent the failure occurrence. The 
maintenance schedule is set based on the prediction of the failure rate. Therefore, 
sometimes failures may occur before the maintenance actions. Then, corrective 
maintenance is also needed. From figure 3.4 we can see, maintenance actions should be 
done at time t1, t2, and t3. This figure also illustrates that the disadvantage of PM is 
ineffectiveness and not cost-efficient. 
 
                           
Figure 3.4 Illustration of preventive maintenance 
 
Predictive maintenance is a condition based management. It relies on the help of 
condition monitoring techniques to when maintenance should be performed. It is more 
accurate and effective. In ideal situation, all failures that is out of the acceptable limit can 
be detected, and hence be corrected.  
              
Figure 3.5 Illustration of preventive maintenance 
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Time, T 
Time, T 
t1 t2 t3 
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3.2.3 Process of the quantitative assessment 
The process of quantitatively assessing the value of maintenance activity includes 6 steps, 
the framework of the methodology is shown in figure 3.6. 
 
Step 1- Description of selected equipment:  
 
The assessment process should commence with the description of the selected equipment. 
As the foundational function of maintenance is to remain and restore the function of 
equipment, before we assess the value of maintenance, we should understand what the 
property of the equipment is and whatfunction the equipment has. This step contains a 
description of each equipment unit for which data have been collected, e.g., pump, 
turbine, and etc.. This step includes the description of equipment’s function, the situation 
of the equipment’s assignment, as well as some technical data (e.g., capacity, size). 
 
Step 2- Identify the possible maintenance activities: 
 
In this step, we should identify the possible maintenance activities that normally be 
implemented in the equipment, and describe the function, mechanism, and costs of each 
maintenance activity. Since the function of these maintenance activities is to prevent the 
failure modes, the value of a maintenance activity is just the risk values saved from the 
failure modes it against to. Normally, one maintenance activity may have the ability to 
prevent several failure modes, therefore, the value should be the sum of all the failure 
modes. 
 
Step 3- Identify the failure modes if one of the maintenance acivities is not performed: 
 
First, we assume one of these maintenance activities is not performed, and identify what 
failure modes will occur in the equipment. The analysis of failure causes and failure 
effects is also necessary. Failure causes is critical to the identification of failure modes as 
the mechanism of failures is very complex. Generally, a certain failure mode can be 
initiated by different causes, for example, an external leakage may be caused by damage 
to shaft seals, or material failures, or failures on seals, and etc.. And also, failures of 
different items can be resulted from a same cause. However the failure modes are the 
same, if the failure causes are different, the consequences will various. For example, the 
external leakage of a pump that caused by a failure on shaft seals can be repaired on line, 
but, the external leakage caused by an internal material failure may lead to a shutdown. 
And the repair costs various greatly. The identification of failure mode effects is used to 
deduce the consequences of the failure mode. 
 
Step 4- Identify the frequency of each failure mode: 
 
The frequency of the failure modes can be identified from many ways, such as historical 
report from operators, reliability report from authorities (for example OREDA), experts’ 
judgment, OEM’s documents, and etc. 
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Step 5- Deduce the consequences of each failure mode: 
 
In this step, we need to identify the consequences of each failure mode. All the risks to 
personnel, to environment, and to asset should be considered. 
 
Step 6- Express the values of the maintenance activities. 
 
The whole assessment process is completed in this step. Til this step, we have got both 
the total saved risk value and the total costs of maintenance, therefore we can figure out 
the value of the maintenance activity by the equation:  
 
Value of maintenance activity= total saved risk value – total costs of maintenance 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Framework of quantify the value of maintenance activity 
 
 
 
Calculate the risk if the maintenance is not performed 
 
Identify the possible maintenance activities  
Description of selected equipment  
Identify the failure modes if one of the maintenance 
activities is not performed  
 
Identify the frequency of each failure mode 
 
 
Identify the consequences of each failure mode 
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4 REFERENCE FRAMEWORK 
This chapter consists of a theoretical reference framework. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to prepare basic theoretical knowledge to the data collection and calculation. 
From the discussion in last chapter we can see, the process of quantitatively assessment 
for value of maintenance activities actually contains two fundamental elements: the one is 
failure mode identification and analysis, and the other is risk assessment. Recall the 
equation of value of maintenance activities: Value of maintenance activity= total saved 
risk value – total costs of maintenance, in order to get the value of maintenance activities, 
we must calculate the total saved risk value. And the result of the total saved risk value is 
coming from these two elements determine. Therefore, the theoretical knowledge 
preparation of these two elements is quite necessary.   
4.1 Failure mode and failure mode identification 
Failure mode is "The manner by which a failure is observed; it generally describes the 
way the failure occurs" (Dodson B. & Nolan D., 1999). From the definition we can see, 
failure mode describes the state of the failure that we can observe from the outside. For 
example, “Internal leakage” is thus a failure mode of a vessel, since the vessel looses its 
required function to “contain liquid.” Wear of the vessel surface, however, represents a 
cause of failure and is hence not a failure mode of the vessel. 
Failure modes have various kinds of classification according to different manners. As 
Blanche and Shrivastava suggested (Blanche K.M, Shrivastava A.B, 1994), failure modes 
can be classified into: 
 
1) Intermittent failures: Failures that result in a lack of some function only for a very 
short period of time. The functional block will revert to its full operational standard 
immediately after the failure. 
2) Extended failures: Failures that result in a lack of some function that will continue 
until some part of the functional block is replaced or repaired. Extended failures may be 
further divided into: 
(a) Complete failures: failures that result in a lack of a required function. 
(b) Partial failures: Failures that lead to a lack of some function but do not cause a 
complete lack of a required function. 
 
Both the complete failures and the partial failures may be further classified: 
(a) Sudden failures: Failures that could not be forecast by prior testing or examination. 
(b) Gradual failures: Failures that could be forecast by testing or examination. A 
gradual failure will represent a gradual “drifting out” of the specified range of 
performance values. The recognition of gradual failures requires comparison of actual 
device performance with a performance specification, and may in some cases be a 
difficult task. 
 
This kind of classification is illustrated in figure 4.1.  
  25 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Failure classification (adapted from Blanche and Shrivastava 1994) 
 
Some other classifications, for example, include: divide failures into primary failures, 
secondary failures, or command faults, and so on. 
 
In this paper, we use the classification suggested by OREDA according to the severity of 
failures. This method of classification has the similar principle with the method suggested 
by Blanche and Shrivastava, which include: 
 
• Critical failure: immediate and complete loss of a system’s capability   
• Degraded failure: not critical, but be gradual or partial, and may develop into a 
critical failure in time.  
• Incipient failure: if not attended to, could result in a critical or degraded failure in 
the near future.  
• Unknown failure: Failure severity was not recorded or could not be deduced (not 
be considered here since it is irregular). 
 
This method illustrates that failure is a dynamic process, which develops from incipient 
state to critical state.  And from this classification we can see that, the critical failure is 
the later period of a failure event, and the primary purpose of maintenance is to prevent 
failure developing into a critical failure. 
4.1.1 Failure modes identification and analysis techniques 
In order to study the failures, many failure modes identification and analysis techniques 
were developed, such as: 
 
• Failure Mode Effects (and Criticality) Analysis (FME(C)A). FMEA is a procedure 
for analysis of potential failure modes within a system for classification by severity or 
Failure 
Intermittent 
failure 
Extended failure 
Partial failure 
Catastrophic 
failure 
Sudden failure 
Complete failure 
Sudden failure Gradual failure 
Degraded failure 
Gradual failure 
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determination of the effect of failures on the system (http://en.wikipedia.org/).  If the 
criticalities or priorities are assigned to the failure mode effects, then, we call this method 
the Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). A fault tree is a logic diagram that displays the 
interrelationships between a potential critical event in a system and the causes for this 
event. 
• Cause and Effect Diagrams (CED). This method is used to identify and describe all 
the potential causes that may result in a specified event. 
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA). Event tree analysis is used to identify the initiating 
event in an accident. 
• Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD). A reliability block diagram is a success-oriented 
network describing the function of the system. 
4.1.2 FMEA 
These techniques are all most commonly used in failure identification and analysis 
depending on their special properties. In this paper, we use FMEA to identify the failure 
modes if the maintenance activities are not performed, as well as their causes and effects 
to the system. 
 
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a procedure by which each potential failure 
mode in a system is analyzed to determine the results or effects thereof on the system and 
to classify each potential failure mode according to its severity (MIL-STD-1629A). 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is widely used in manufacturing industries in 
various phases of the product life cycle and is now increasingly finding use in the service 
industry.  
 
Failure cause is the physical or chemical processes, .design defects, quality defects, part 
misapplication, or other processes which are the basic reason for failure or which initiate 
the physical process by which deterioration proceeds to failure (MIL-STD-1629A). 
 
Failure effect is the consequence(s) a failure mode has on the operation, function, or 
status of an item. Failure effects are classified as local effect, next higher level, and end 
effect (MIL-STD-1629A). 
 
FMEA is used to identify potential failure modes, determine their effect on the operation 
of the product, and identify actions to mitigate the failures. A crucial step is anticipating 
what might go wrong with a product. While anticipating every failure mode is not 
possible, the development team should formulate as extensive a list of potential failure 
modes as possible. 
 
FMEA's provide the engineer with a tool that can assist in providing reliable, safe, and 
customer pleasing products and processes. Since FMEA help the engineer identify 
potential product or process failures, they can use it to: 
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• Develop product or process requirements that minimize the likelihood of those 
failures.  
• Evaluate the requirements obtained from the customer or other participants in the 
design process to ensure that those requirements do not introduce potential failures.  
• Identify design characteristics that contribute to failures and design them out of 
the system or at least minimize the resulting effects.  
• Develop methods and procedures to develop and test the product/process to 
ensure that the failures have been successfully eliminated.  
• Track and manage potential risks in the design. Tracking the risks contributes to 
the development of corporate memory and the success of future products as well.  
 
FMEA is designed to assist the engineer improve the quality and reliability of design. 
Properly used the FMEA provides the engineer several benefits. Among others, these 
benefits include: 
 
• Improve product/process reliability and quality  
• Increase customer satisfaction  
• Early identification and elimination of potential product/process failure modes  
• Prioritize product/process deficiencies  
• Capture engineering/organization knowledge  
• Emphasizes problem prevention  
• Documents risk and actions taken to reduce risk  
• Provide focus for improved testing and development  
• Minimizes late changes and associated cost  
• Catalyst for teamwork and idea exchange between functions 
 
The FMEA shall be initiated as an integral part of early design process of system 
functional assemblies and shall be updated to reflect design changes. Current FMEA 
analysis shall be a major consideration at each design review from preliminary through 
the final design. The analysis shall be used to assess high risk items and the activities 
underway to provide corrective actions. The FMEA shall also be used to define special 
test considerations, quality inspection points, preventive maintenance actions, operational 
constraints, useful life, and other pertinent information and activities necessary to 
minimize failure risk. All recommended actions which result from the FMEA shall be 
evaluated and formally dispositioned by appropriate implementation or documented 
rationale for no action. Unless otherwise specified, the following discrete steps shall be 
used in performing an FMEA:  
 
1) Define the system to be analyzed. Complete system definition includes 
identification of internal and interface functions, expected performance at all indenture 
levels, system restraints, and failure definitions. Functional narratives of the system 
should include descriptions of each mission in terms of functions which identify tasks to 
be performed for each mission, mission phase, and operational mode. Narratives should 
describe the environmental profiles, expected mission times and equipment utilization, 
and the functions and outputs of each item.  
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2) Construct block diagrams. Functional and reliability block diagrams which 
illustrate the operation, interrelationships, and interdependencies of functional entities 
should be obtained or constructed for each item configuration involved in the system's 
use. All system interfaces shall be indicated.  
 
3) Identify all potential item and interface failure modes and define their effect on 
the immediate function or item, on the system, and on the mission to be performed. 
 
4) Evaluate each failure mode in terms of the worst potential consequences which 
may result and assign a severity classification category.  
 
5) Identify failure detection methods and compensating provisions for each failure 
mode. 
 
6) Identify corrective design or other actions required to eliminate the failure or 
control the risk.  
 
7) Identify effects of corrective actions or other system attributes, such as 
requirements for logistics support. 
 
8) Document the analysis and summarize the problems which could not be corrected 
by design and identify the special controls which are necessary to reduce failure risk. 
4.2 Risk and risk assessment 
Offshore installations are characterized by high risks. Since the exploration actions 
commenced in NCS, more than 20 major accidents have occurred. It will be a great 
interest if we can comprehensively understand the risks and find out methods to prevent 
or mitigate the risks.  
4.2.1 Overview of risk 
As Terje Aven pointed, “risk is used to express the danger that undesirable events 
represents to human beings, the environment and economic value” (Terje Aven, 2002). 
The risk associated with failure is difined as the product of probability of failure and 
consequence of failure (DNV RP-G 101, 2002), where the consequence of failure means 
the different effects of failure.No mater how the expression of risk various, by 
distributions, expected values, etc. a most commonly used expression of risk is that risk is 
the combination of probability and consequences.  
 
The expression of risk is shown in the following equation, which is calculated by 
multiplying probability and numerical value of the consequence for each accident 
sequence i, and summed over all potential accident sequences: 
 
R=∑i (Pi * Ci) 
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        Where:  
                 P = probability of accidents 
                 C = consequence of accidents 
It should be noted that the expression of risk as expected consequence is a statistical 
expression, which often implies that the value will have to be established over a long 
period, with low annual values (J. E. Vinnem, 2007). Risk is usually regarded to be a 
statistical or prababitic term, which links with future uncertainty. The risk consequence 
may never be observed. 
4.2.2 Risk elements 
When accident consequences are considered, these may be related to personnel, to the 
environment, and to assets and production capacity (J. E. Vinnem, 2007). The 
consequence of failures can therefore be categorized into the following dimensions: 
 
1) Personnel risk which includes: 
• Fatality risk 
• Impairment risk 
 
2) Environmental risk 
3) Asset risk which include: 
• Material damage risk 
• Production delay risk 
Personnel risk 
It should be noted that risk to personnel is mainly focused on fatality risk, or aspects that 
are vital for minimization of fatality risk (J. E. Vinnem, 2007). In the Oil & Gas industry 
in Norwegian, people use the term “major accident” as the criteria. The interpretation of 
“major accident” is the accident which has the potential to cause five fatalities or more. In 
reflecting these criteria, people take more attention on preventing fatality risks. The 
frequency of impairment is the term used to express the risk aspects to the safety of 
personnel. 
 
Fatality risk 
 
Fatality risk is the most serious consequence among all of the consequences in the case of 
offshore installation. There are a number of ways to express the fatality risk, such as 
platform fatality risk, individual risk, and group risk and f-N curve. The following are the 
main characteristics that are used in order to form the example shown in table: 
• The average number of persons on the platform is 220. 
• Each person has an annual number of 3000 exposure hours offshore. 
• Elements of risk are shown in table: 
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Table 4.1 Fatality risk form (adopt from J. E. Vinnem, 2007) 
 
Fatalities  per accident Risk values Average 
manning 1 2-5 6-20 21-100 101-220 
Sum frequencies 220 0.033 0 0.01 0.003 0.0008 
Geometrical mean  1 3.2 10 44.7 148 
Consequence       
PLL contribution  0.033 0 0.1 0-134 0-118 
Total PLL 0.386      
FAR value 20.0      
AIR value 0.00058      
 
The following figures which are published by HSE could give us a general impress of 
fatality risk in offshore installations (Offshore safety statistics bulletin 2006/2007): 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Fatal and Major Injuries 1997/1998 – 2006/2007p 
 
Figure 4.3 Combined Fatal and Major Injury Rate 1997/1998 – 2006/07p 
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Environment risk 
The environment risk from offshore installations is dominated by the largest spills from 
blowouts, pipeline leaks or storage leaks; process leaks, although more frequent, are not 
normally capable of causing extensive damage to the environment (J. E. Vinnem, 2007). 
The exclusion of non-process leaks is due to the fact that the circumstances surrounding 
of hydrocarbon leaks are different with the circumstances associated with leaks from 
auxiliary system, drilling system, etc (Vinnem, J.E etal, 2007). 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the number of hydrocarbon leaks for all installations during 10 years 
period, from 1996 to 2006. It is rather difficult to make a clear conclusion due to the 
variation in the data, but from 2002 to 2006, there is an obvious declining trend for 
categories leak rate 0.1 - 1 kg/s and 1 - 10 kg/s. The declining trend is not likely 
happened to category leak over 10kg/s since there was an incident on Visund platform in 
19 January 2006, where one huge gas cloud was formed at the free surface of all 
installation. That incident was initiated by leaks that estimated to be 900kg/s.  
 
Figure 4.4 Number of Leaks for all installations in Norwegian Sector (source: PSA, 
2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Number of Hydrocarbon Leaks in Norwegian and British continental shelf, 
normalized against installation, rolling 3-years average (source: PSA, 2007) 
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Asset risk 
The asset risk is comprised of possible damage to equipment and structures, as will as the 
resulting disruption of production (J. E. Vinnem, 2007). According to the definition, 
when we calculate the asset risk, the following aspects should be considered: 
 
• Cost of spare parts. The spare parts are the materials that used to replace the damaged 
parts of equipment or structures, as well as the consumed materials that are used in the 
repair actions. 
• Cost of repair action. The cost of repair action is the cost of implementing the repair 
action, which mainly means the maintenance man-hour cost required to maintain the 
system and equipment within the vendors’ scope of supply.  
• Downtime loss. The production lost in downtime. 
• Production degraded loss. The loss due to the degradation of production. 
4.2.3 Probability and frequency 
Probabilities are used when considering future events with more than one possible 
outcome. In a given situation only one of these outcomes will occur; in advance we 
cannot say which. Such situations are called stochastic, as opposed to deterministic 
situations where the outcome is determined in advance. The probability of an event is a 
measure of the chance that an event will occur. It is measured as a value in the interval 
(0,1). Probabilities are usually assessed (estimated) by experience data, such as accident 
statistics and the operating statistics of components and systems. 
 
A frequency expresses an average number of events per unit of time or per operation. The 
connection between frequency and probability is illustrated in the following example. 
Assume that we for a specific company have calculated a frequency of accidents leading 
to personnel injuries, are 7 per year, i.e. 7/8760 = 0.0008 per hour. The probability that 
such an accident will occur during one hour can therefore be assessed at 0.0008= 0.08%. 
such a probability interpretation of the frequency value can be justified when this value is 
small; how small depends on the desired accuracy. As a rule of thumb one often use “less 
than 0.01” (T. Aven, 2002) 
 
According to Aven & Vinnem, there are two main interpretations of probability (T. Aven 
& J.E Vinnem, 2007): 
 
a) The classical interpretation. A probability is interpreted in the classical statistical 
sense as the relative fraction of times the events occur if the situation analysed were 
hypothetically “repeated” an infinite number of times. According to this interpretation, 
the probability of an event A, is also called relative frequency, which is defined in the 
following way: if an experiment is performed n times and the event A occurs nA times, 
then P(A) =limn→∞ nA/ n. the probability P(A) is a theoretical quantity that usually is 
unknown and has to be estimated from experience data. 
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b) Subjective probability. Probability is a measure of expressing uncertainty as to the 
possible outcomes, seen through the eyes of the assessor and based on some background 
information and knowledge. This interpretation expresses a person’s or groups’ 
uncertainty/belief about what will happen. For example” the probability that Viking will 
win a medal in this year’s soccer league is 25%”. 
 
Following definition a) we produce estimates of the underlying true risk. This estimate is 
uncertain, as there could be large differences between the estimate and the correct risk 
value. As these correct values are unknown it is difficult to know how accurate the 
estimates are. 
 
Following definition b), we assign a probability by performing uncertainty assessments, 
and there is no reference to a correct probability. There are no uncertainties related to the 
assigned probabilities, as they are expressions of uncertainties.  
 
If there is a real risk level, it is relevant to consider and discuss the uncertainties of the 
risk estimates compared to the real risk. If probability is a measure of the analyst’s 
uncertainty, a risk assignment is a judgment and there is no reference to a correct and 
objective risk level. 
 
In some cases we have references levels through historical records. These numbers do not 
however express risk, but they provide a basis for expressing risk. In principle, there is a 
huge step from historical data to risk, which is a statement concerning the future. In 
practice, many analysts do not distinguish between the data and the risk derived from the 
data. This is unfortunate, as the historical data may, to varying degree, be representative 
for the future, and the amount of data may often be very limited. A mechanical 
transformation from historical data to risk numbers should be avoided. 
 
The risk analyses establish a basis for making decisions relating to choice of 
arrangements and measures, including maintenance actions and strategies. They are 
especially suitable for identifying equipment and activities that significantly affect risk, 
and or analyzing the effect of risk reducing activities. (S. Apeland  & T. Aven, 2000) 
4.2.4 Risk assessment 
Risk may be expressed by the consequence spectrum (K1, F1), (K2, F2),…, where Fi 
designates the frequency of undesirable events leading to the consequence Ki, or possibly 
the probability that an undesirable event shall occur which gives the consequence Ki (J.E 
Vinnem, 2007). 
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Figure 4.6: General risk model 
 
Normally, we use statistically expected (mean) loss as a measure to express the 
consequences of risk. Once the losses C1, C2, ….., are determined The value is calculated 
by multiplying the losses by the corresponding frequencies (probabilities) and summing 
over all the relevant consequences, i.e. 
 
Statistically expected loss= C1×F1+ C2×F2+… 
 
The rigor of assessment should be proportionate to the complexity of the problem and the 
magnitude of risk (HSE, 3/2006). Based on this consideration, there are three types of 
approach to assess risk, they are: 
 
• Qualitative (Q), in which frequency and severity are determined purely qualitatively.  
• Semi-quantitative (SQ), in which frequency and severity are approximately quantified 
within ranges.  
• Quantified risk assessment (QRA), in which full quantification occurs.  
 
This division of risk assessment reflects the different requirements of the risk assessment 
level of detail from low to high, see figure 4.7. The amount of detail and effort required 
increases from qualitative (Q) to semi-quantitative (SQ) to quantified risk assessment 
(QRA). 
 
Activity Undesirable 
events 
Consequences     Loss 
    K1                            C1 
    K2                            C2 
    K3                            C3 
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Figure 4.7 Level of risk assessment (source: Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore 
Installations,HSE) 
 
When we make the decision of which approach should be use, the following dimensions 
must be taken into account:  
• The level of estimated risk (and its proximity to the limits of tolerability).  
• The complexity of the problem and/or difficulty in answering the question of whether 
more needs to be done to reduce the risk. 
 
When we consider the Q or SQ approaches, a risk matrix is usually used as a method to 
rank and present the risks. It is important that the risk matrix used should be capable of 
discriminating between the risks of the different hazardous events for the installation 
(HSE, 3/2006). Normally, the more complex the matrix is, the better it is in 
discrimination.  A 5 x 5 matrix will give greater opportunity for such discrimination than 
a 3 x 3.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Risk matrix 
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Quantitative risk assessment is very useful because quantification of risk results in the 
numerical value of risk, it provides important decision-making tools to the maintenance 
managers. By using the results of a QRA, the manager is able to answer questions such as  
 
• Which events are most likely to happen? 
•  Which event is the most critical? 
•  Is it necessary to reduce the risk? 
•  What mitigation measures are most effective? 
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5 DATA COLLECTION 
A data collection sheet is drawing out in this chapter to explain what data should collect 
and how to do calculation. 
 
In order to collect and analyze the data, a sheet for assessment is designed, see the sample 
in figure 4.1, and the original sheet is in Appendix A: 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Sheet for assessment of value of maintenance 
 
The data collection sheet contains five parts: Taxonomy number, Equipment description 
part, Maintenance concepts part, Failure mode effects analysis part, and Risk assessment 
part. In the end of the sheet is the value of each maintenance activity. The sheet is 
designed following the logic of the quantitative assessment process of the maintenance 
value. 
 
5.1 Taxonomy code 
Taxonomy code is the ID of equipment. For each of the equipments, a group of letters is 
given. These letters describe the equipment’s type, design property, and the functional 
system where the equipment belongs to. Using the taxonomy code, we can fast identify 
the target equipment we want to study. For example, the taxonomy code PU-CE-FF, 
which is illustrated in figure 4.2, means a centrifugal pump used in fire-fighting system. 
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Figure 5.2 Taxonomy code (source: OREDA 2002) 
5.2 Equipment description part 
The equipment description part contains a description of each equipment unit for which 
data have been collected, e.g., pump, turbine, and etc.. This part includes the description 
of equipment’s function, the situation of the equipment’s assignment, as well as some 
technical data (e.g., capacity, size). 
The data and information we need to collect in this part include: 
 
• The equipment’s function in the system. Failure means loss of function. Therefore, 
the equipment’s function is directly linked with the failure effects. This information can 
help to determine the failure effects to the system, e.g., will it affects the production 
regularity or the Health, Safety and Environment, or both of them if the equipment fails.  
 
• The equipment’s performance. Regularity performance measures are used both in 
analyses for prediction and for reporting of historical performance in the operational 
phase. This information can be used to determine how much the effect is if a failure mode 
occurs. For different equipment or facility, we use different measures to record its 
performance: 
a) for oil production equipments, we use production rate (volume oil per time) 
b) for injection equipments, we use injection rate (volume per time) 
c) for transport equipments, we use flow rate (volume per time) 
d) for storage equipments, we use storage capacity (volume) 
e) for other equipments, we decide the measures according to their individual 
function. 
 
• The assignment of the equipments. This term describes the assignment of the 
equipments with the same function in the system, which includes how many 
homogeneous equipment in the system, the layout (parallel or serial), and etc.. This 
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information can also help us to determine the equipment’s criticality and the effects if the 
equipment fails. For example, the equipment which has no standby or installed spares or 
the equipment which is in a serial connection is much more critical than the equipment 
which is parallel connected by another equipment with the same function, because once 
the equipment fails, the whole process may be shutdown. And as the number of 
equipments that are parallel connected increases, the criticality of the equipment 
decreases.  
5.3 Maintenance concept part 
The Maintenance part contains information about the maintenance activities that are 
implemented on the equipment, which includes the name of the maintenance activity, its 
function, the cost of the maintenance activity, and its value.  
5.4 Failure mode effects analysis part 
This part contains the identification of the failure modes, failure mechanism, and the 
failure mode effects. 
5.5 Risk assessment part 
The risk assessment part is the core of the sheet. In this part, the following terms should 
be identified: 
• Severity class 
• Failure frequency  
• Active repair hours 
• Consequence loss 
• Risk value  
• HSE risk assessment 
 
5.5.1 Severity class 
As we mentioned before, based on the severity, the failures can be classified into: 
 
• Critical failure: immediate and complete loss of a system’s capability   
• Degraded failure: not critical, but be gradual or partial, and may develop into a 
critical failure in time.  
• Incipient failure: if not attended to, could result in a critical or degraded failure in 
the near future.  
• Unknown failure: Failure severity was not recorded or could not be deduced (not 
be considered here). 
 
This classification is adopted by OREDA. Since the reliability data we used in this papare 
is based on OREDA, we also follow the way of classifying the failures. 
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Among these four failures, only the critical and degraded failures are interesting to the 
research. That is because the purpose we apply preventive maintenance or predictive 
maintenance is to detect and eliminate failure at the incipient state, so that it cannot bring 
damage to the system. Therefore, we will only collect critical and degraded failure data in 
the sheet. 
5.5.2 Failure frequency 
According to the Norsok Standard Z-008, the assessment of failure probabilities is 
implicitly expressed by the maintenance intervals documented for the different generic 
maintenance concepts, which again should be based on well documented operational 
experience and failure characteristics (Norsok Standard Z-008). The OREDA is estimated 
from both the historical records and the experts’ judgment, it is the most trustable 
database available now. In this sheet, we will adopt the failure frequency data from 
OREDA. 
5.5.3 Active repair hours and man-hour 
The active repair hours can be used to calculate the downtime loss. We can also adopt the 
data from OREDA. 
5.5.4 Consequence loss 
The consequence of risk has two perspectives, the economic perspective and the HSE 
perspective. The economic perspective can be expressed quantitatively, but the HSE 
perspective can not. According to the Norsok Standard Z-008, the consequences of MF 
failures are assessed according to the effect on the plant and system level with respect to 
production loss and direct cost measured in downtime and monetary terms, while 
consequences of personal injury and environmental damage are classified according to 
pre-defined consequence classes and acceptance criteria (Norsok Standard Z-008). In this 
column, we only collect the data of economic perspective. 
 
The economic consequence should be presented in financial terms using appropriate 
currency units (DNV RP-G 101, 2002), it includes the loss due to the damage on the 
production regularity and the HSE loss which can be presented in financial terms. The 
terms we need to collect include: 
 
• Production degradation loss  
• Downtime loss 
• Repair cost 
• lost Oil cost 
• Clean-up and fine cost of oil leakage 
 
Production degradation loss (PDL): 
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 PDL=y1-∫Y(t) dt, but since only degraded failure is considered here, the failure interval 
t1-t2 is small, we approximately calculate PDL by PDL=1/2*y1*(t2-t1), and the result is 
so small compare with the downtime loss, that it can be ignored. 
 
Downtime loss (DL): 
 
DL= down time * Production rate 
 
Repair cost (RC):  
 
Repair cost includes two terms: Corrective maintenance man-hours (CMM), and 
Corrective maintenance spare parts (CMSP) (Norsok Standard O-CR-001). The equation 
is: RC= CMM+ CMSP   
 
Lost oil cost (LO):  
         
Oil lost cost is the monetary value of the lost oil due to leakage or other reasons. The 
equation is: LO = the volume of lost oil * oil price 
 
Clean-up and fine cost of oil leakage (CFC): 
 
This term expresses the economic perspective of the environmental risk. According to the 
research by Exxon Valdez in the Prince William Sound in Alaska in 1989, the criteria are: 
 
• Approximately 440 000 NOK (1997 value) per ton oil spilled in clean-up cost. 
• Approximately 1 million NOK (actual values paid) per ton oil spilled in 
compensation, fines, etc. 
 
If one turns to more moderate spills (500 tons to 5 000 tons), a typical clean-up cost may 
be in the order of 150 000 NOK per ton oil that has stranded. (Norsok Standard Z-013).  
 
HSE risk assessment 
 
The HSE risk has 2 perspectives: 
 
•  Environment perspectives. According to Norsok Standard Z-013, valuation of 
risk to environment may include many different aspects: 
a) Clean up cost. 
b) Cost of lost oil. 
c) Compensation to the fishing and fish farming industries, local communities, etc. 
for loss of income due to environmental damage. 
d) Intangible aspects, e.g. loss of reputation, social effects.  
 
• Personnel perspectives, which include personnel injury and fatality. in production 
system, the causes include: 
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a) Fire & Explosion (major accident) 
b) Falling load 
c) Poisoning, asphyxiation, radiation. 
d) Electric shock. 
e) Damage caused by tools, machinery 
 
It should be noted that, the HSE consequence is much more difficult to be quantitatively 
expressed, because: 
 
1) It is more complex, contains tangible and intangible perspectives, some intangible 
perspectives such as the damage to the ecology, the social effects, is difficult to quantify. 
2) Normally, the HSE risk is dominated by large system or plant level accident, or major 
accident, e.g. Fire & Explosion. These system or plant level accidents are mostly caused 
by the synergic effect of many small, equipment level failures. A single equipment level 
failure can rarely cause such kind of accident. For example, a fire & explosion accident 
must have two necessary conditions, they are flammable materials and ignition sources, 
sometimes, the failure of fire detect and fire-fight system may be also an option. 
Therefore, the leakage failure may have the risk of fire, but only a leakage cannot initiate 
a fire accident. 
 
However, the HSE risk of a failure is much more critical than the economic risk, as once 
it happened, it will be damaged. Therefore, although we are not able to use numerical 
value to express the HSE risk, we need to use some other ways, such as qualitative 
assessment to record the potential HSE risk of a failure. And when we make maintenance 
plan, the maintenance activities that have the contribution to HSE risk have the priority to 
be implemented. 
 
The standards to classify the HSE consequences are given by many documents, such as  
the HSE’s report ” Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases”, Norsok Standards S-002, Z-013, Z-
016, and etc. Based on these standards, we can qualitatively assess the HSE risk of 
failures. 
 
1) General consequence classification 
 
To classify the most serious effect of loss of functionality (both loss of MF and sub 
functions) the consequence classes defined in Table 5.1 should be applied, unless 
otherwise specified. (Norsok Standards Z-013). 
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Table 5.1 General consequence classification 
 
 
2) Consequence classification for containment (External leakage) 
 
Table 5.2 Consequence classification for containment (External leakage) 
 
 
3) Effect of pollution 
 
The Norsok Standards Z-013 suggests the consequence classification caused by pollution 
as following: 
 
Potential for large pollution: 
- Hydrocarbons : > 100 m3 
- Chemical group 1 : > 200 liters 
- Chemical group 2 : > 1 m3 
- Chemical group 3 : > 10 m3 
 
Potential for moderate pollution: 
- Hydrocarbons : 1 – 100 m3 
- Chemical group 1 : 25 – 200 liters 
- Chemical group 2 : 0.25 – 1 m3 
- Chemical group 3 : 1 – 10 m3 
  44 
 
No potential for pollution exceeding: 
- Hydrocarbons : < 1 m3 
- Chemical group 1 : < 25 liters 
- Chemical group 2 : < 200 liters 
- Chemical group 3 : < 1 m3 
 
4) Cost of human life 
 
As the Norsok Standard Z-013 pointed, various studies have on the other hand, shown 
that our society implicitly uses such values, as decision support related to investment in 
accident prevention measures in transportation, medical treatment, life insurance, etc. 
 
• £ 0,6 M (6-7 MNOK) in nuclear industry, published by HSE 
• 10-20 MNOK, published by Norsok Standard Z-013 
100 MNOK or more if consider the willingness to pay for averting a statistical fatality, 
Norsok Standard Z-013 
Total risk value 
Since only the economic risk is able to be quantified, the total risk value should be 
expressed by the monetary risk value of each failure modes. The total risk value is 
calculated by the product of frequency of failure mode and the sum of its consequence 
losses.  
 
Total risk value = Frequency * ∑ (PDL+DL+RC+LO+CFC) 
 
 
finally, we can get the value of maintenance activity by using the Risk value minus the 
Cost of maintenance activity. Although the HSE risk cannot be expressed by numerical 
value, it is also the contribution of maintenance activity, and need to be well considered. 
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6 CASE STUDY 
In this chapter, pumps used in offshore Oil & Gas production system will be taken as an 
example to illustrate how to quantify the values of maintenance activities, as well as the 
illustration of how much are the values. 
  
6.1 Background  
Offshore installation is a huge and complicated system. Normally, an offshore Oil & Gas 
production system can be categorized into four sub-systems according to their function, 
include production system, process system, drilling system, and utility system. Under 
these four sub-systems, there are amount of units and equipments. The following figure 
gives a simplified overview of the typical oil and gas production system (Devold, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Overview of Oil and Gas production system (source: Håvard Devold, 2008) 
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In this chapter, we will select three pumps from three different function sub-systems as a 
case study, to evaluate the maintenance actions on them by this quantitative assessment 
method.  
6.2 Introduction 
Pump as an energy transfer device is widely used in offshore installations. As pump has 
the function of raising, transporting, and compressing liquid, it can be found in almost 
every section of petroleum industry, such as in fire-fighting system, piping system, 
production system, and processing system.  
6.2.1 Overview of a typical pump 
A typical pump system is usually divided into six sub-units (OREDA, 2002): 
 
• Driver unit 
• Power transmission unit 
• Pump unit 
• Control and monitoring unit 
• Lubrication unit 
• Miscellaneous (include all sub-units that are unknown) 
 
The construction of a typical pump system and the maintainable items are shown 
individually in the figure 6.2 and table 6.1. Generally, all pumps are similar in their 
construction and components. However, for their different application, they may be 
design and built differently. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Construction of a typical pump system (adapt from OREDA) 
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Table 6.1 Maintenance items of a typical pump 
 
6.2.2 Types of pumps commonly used in offshore installation 
Generally, two types of pump are usually used in offshore installations. They are: 
 
• Centrifugal pump. Centrifugal pumps are the most commonly used pumps in 
petroleum industry. Among all the installed pumps in a typical petroleum plant, almost 
80-90% are centrifugal pumps (Girdhar & Moniz, 2005). Centrifugal pumps have the 
advantage of design simplicity, high efficiency, wide range of capacity, head, smooth 
flow rate, and ease of operation and maintenance (Girdhar & Moniz, 2005). They are 
widely used for fire fighting, injection, oil handling, O&G processing, etc,.  
• Positive displacement pumps. Positive displacement pumps, which life a given 
volume for each cycle of operation, can be divided into two main classes, reciprocating 
and rotary (Girdhar & Moniz, 2005.). Reciprocating pumps are usually used for chemical 
injection, gas processing, and gas treatment, while rotary pumps are mainly used for oily 
water treatment in offshore installation.  
6.2.3 Application of pumps in offshore installation 
Pumps are used in every phase of petroleum production, transportation, and refinery 
(Girdhar & Moniz, 2005). The primary areas that pumps applied in offshore O&G 
production system include (Karassik & Igor, 2000): 
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• Fire pumps. Normally, the active fire-fighting system centers around a ring main 
which pressurized by at least two fire pumps as shown on the sketch. (Angus Mather). 
The fire pumps may be manually activated from strategic locations such as the main 
control room, helideck and process areas, or automatically by a significant drop in ring. 
The number of fire pumps required will be determined from the fire and explosion 
analysis but normally, at least two independently powered fire pumps will be found on an 
offshore installation. The number of pumps installed should reflect the possibility of the 
unavailability of equipment due to breakdown or maintenance requirements. Each pump 
should be capable of supplying adequate water to operate the largest section of deluge 
equipment in addition to maintaining the pressure. 
 
• Production pumps. Production pumps include reciprocating units for mud circulation 
during drilling and sucker-rod, hydraulic rod less, and motor driven submersible 
centrifugal units for lifting crude to the surface. The most common use of centrifugal 
pumps in production is for water flooding (secondary recovery, subsidence prevention, or 
pressure maintenance).  
 
• Transportation pumps. Transportation pumps include units for gathering, for on and 
offshore production, for pipelining crude and refined products, for loading and unloading 
tankers, tank cars, barges, or tank trucks, and for servicing airport fueling terminals. The 
majority of the units are centrifugal. Refining units vary from single stage centrifugal 
units to horizontal and vertical multistage barrel type pumps handling a variety of 
products over a full range of temperatures and pressures. Centrifugal pumps are also used 
for auxiliary services, such as cooling towers and cooling water. Except for some 
comments about the use of displacement pumps for handling viscous liquids, this section 
is restricted to centrifugal pumps, the type most frequently used in the petroleum 
industry. It also includes an overview of the requirements for some of the principal types 
of centrifugal pumps.  
 
Identification the application area of a pump is a fundamental and critical work in this 
quantitative method. That is because for different use, the types, size, functions of pumps 
various. And as the operational environment, the performance requirement, and the 
medium that the pumps transport are different, the failure modes of pumps will be 
different. These factors determined the pumps diversities in major failure modes, failure 
frequency, as well as the effects to the whole system if a pump failed. For example, as the 
OREDA pointed, the centrifugal pump can be used in 20 application areas, include: 
chemical injection, combined function, cooling systems, crude oil handling, emergency 
power, gas processing, gas treatment, sea water lift, water fire fighting, and so on. Among 
these tasks, the pumps used for chemical transportation e.g. chemical injection, crude oil 
handling are easier to have corrosions than the pump used for transporting water such as 
water injection and fire fighting; the failure of a pump for injection will affect the 
production regularity, while the failure of a pump for fire fighting could lead to an fire 
accident. 
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6.2.4 Operational characters of pumps 
It is a complicate task to evaluate the performance of a pump as there are many factors 
that can influence the performance. For the purpose of assessing the value of maintenance 
activity in this paper, we only need to understand three primary characters of pumps, they 
are introduced as following: 
 
1) Flow rate. Low rate is the first and most important character we need to collect as the 
pump is a liquid transportation machinery. The units of flow rate that are mostly used are 
m
3/h or gpm (gallon per minute). 
 
2) Head. Significance of using the “head” term instead of the “pressure” term. The 
pressure at any point in a liquid can be thought of as being caused by a vertical column of 
the liquid due to its weight. The height of this column is called the static head and is 
expressed in terms of feet of liquid. The same head term is used to measure the kinetic 
energy created by the pump. In other words, head is a measurement of the height of a 
liquid column that the pump could create from the kinetic energy imparted to the liquid. 
Imagine a pipe shooting a jet of water straight up into the air, the height the water goes up 
would be the head. The head is not equivalent to pressure. Head is a term that has units of 
a length or feet and pressure has units of force per unit area or pound per square inch. The 
main reason for using head instead of pressure to measure a centrifugal pump's energy is 
that the pressure from a pump will change if the specific gravity (weight) of the liquid 
changes, but the head will not change. Since any given centrifugal pump can move a lot 
of different fluids, with different specific gravities, it is simpler to discuss the pump's 
head and forget about the pressure. The term of head is expressed by the equation of H= 
(Pd-Ps)*10/ρ, where: Pd is the discharge pressure, Ps is the suction pressure, and ρ is the 
specific gravity of the liquid. 
 
3) Pump efficiency. The pump does not completely convert kinetic energy to pressure 
energy since some of the kinetic energy is lost in this process. Pump efficiency is a factor 
that accounts for these energy losses. Every pump is designed for a specific flow and a 
corresponding differential head, though it is possible to operate at certain percentage 
points away from the designed values. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the operational characters of a typical centrifugal pump: 
 
Table 6.2 Operational characters of a centrifugal pump  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Operating Time (hours) 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 1,500 
Flow Rate (gpm) 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 
Head (feet) 160 155 145 134 120 
Pump Efficiency (%) 63 76 82 82.5 80 
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The relationships between flow rate and head, and flow rate and pump efficiency are 
shown in figure 6.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 A typical pump characteristic curve 
6.3 Pump system modeling 
Before we go on the discussion, some assumptions should be done for theoretical study: 
 
• No maintenance actions are performed on the equipment. Once a failure occurs, 
we will let the equipment run to complete failure.  
 
• The effectiveness will not be considered in this paper. As we mentioned before, 
the preventive maintenance is ineffective due to the difference between the maintenance 
frequency and the failure frequency.  To some extent, the predictive maintenance also has 
effective problems. These effectiveness problems will not be considered in this paper, we 
assume the failures can be detected immediately as they occur, and sequentially 
corrective maintenance will be implemented.  
 
• In order to illustrate the exact contribution value of maintenance activity, we 
assume there is no acceptable limit on the equipment performance. Once the performance 
start declining, we believe failure occurs. 
 
In order to illustrate how to quantitatively assessing the value of maintenance activity, we 
build up a model of the pump system in an offshore production system: 
 
An offshore platform is located in an oil field in the North Sea. The total numbers of wells 
are 6 produce wells and 3 injection wells. Every third well will be a water injector. The 
production well rate is 5000 m3/day and the processing capacity of the platform will be 
25000 m3/day. The injection wells are driven by centrifugal pumps which has the 
injection rate is 6000 m3/day, each well has the estimated increased oil production of 
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2400 m3/d. The transportation system in the processing section is driven by a group of 
centrifugal pumps, each of them has the flow rate of 1300 m3/h. The platform also has a 
fire-fighting system, which is composed by 2 fire-fighting pumps. Each of the pump has 
the flow rate of 900 m3/h.  
 
The figures we used in this model are adapted from “Pump Handbook" (Karassik & Igor, 
2000) and “Subsea Pumps” (Sølvik, 2007).  
 
According to the pump system modeling, the description of pumps is shown in Table 6.3: 
 
Table 6.3 Description of pumps 
Taxonomic code Equipment function Equipment capacity 
PU-CE-WI Water injection Injection rate 6000 m3/d, 
estimated increased oil 
production of 100 m3/h 
PU-CE-OP Transport oil in oil processing system Flow rate 1300 m3/h 
PU-CE-FF Fire-fighting pump Flow rate 900 m3/h 
 
6.4 Assess the value of maintenance activities  
 
6.4.1 Failure modes identification 
As OREDA lists, the typical failure modes that often occur on pumps include: 
 
• abnormal instrument reading 
• breakdown 
• erratic output 
• external leakage-process medium 
• external leakage-utility medium 
• fail to start on demand 
• fail to stop on demand 
• high output 
• internal leakage 
• low output 
• minor in-service problems 
• noise 
• overheating 
• parameter deviation  
• spurious stop 
• structural deficiency 
• unknown 
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• vibration 
 
Among these failure modes, external leakage (process and utility medium), internal 
leakage, and fail to start on demand are the major failure modes which typically occur on 
centrifugal pumps, see table 6.4. For different pumps, the frequency of major failures 
various as the design features, functions, etc. are different. For example, the oil 
processing pumps are used to transport chemical liquid which may mixed with crude oil, 
produced water, sand, etc., therefore, the leakage failures occur more frequently than the 
other two types of pumps, as the water injection pumps and fire-fighting pumps are used 
to transport pure water.  
 
Table 6.4 Major failure modes on pumps 
 
 
Taxonomic 
code 
Failure Modes Severity 
class 
Failure 
Frequency (106 
hours) 
Active 
rep.hr manhours 
Breakdown Critical 0.93 4.0 8.0 
Critical 11.47 39.0 52.0 External leakage-
process medium Degrade    
Critical 3.27 15.1 30.4 External leakage-
utility medium Degrade 11.22 32.5 53.4 
Critical 13.76 57.2 63.4 
PU-CE-WI 
Fail to start on 
demand Degrade 37.36 17.2 25.7 
Breakdown Critical 4.96   
Critical 66.25 11.2 11.2 External leakage-
process medium Degrade    
Critical    External leakage-
utility medium Degrade 93.14 6.2 55.8 
Critical 7.18 6.0 6.0 
PU-CE-OP 
Fail to start on 
demand Degrade 
   
Critical    External leakage-
process medium Degrade 25.8 1.0 2.0 
Critical    External leakage-
utility medium Degrade 372.7 7.1 14.2 
Critical 31.38 3.6 12.8 
PU-CE-FF 
Fail to start on 
demand Degrade 49.37 3.3 6.5 
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6.4.2 Failure causes and failure effects 
The failures of centrifugal pumps can be categorized as following types according to the 
failure mechanism: 
• Hydraulic problems include lose of priming, cavitations, suction of foreign 
materials, and etc.  
• Mechanical problems include the general mechanical problems, problems in 
sealing area, bearing, shafts, valves, and etc. 
• Other problems  
(The detailed information about failure causes of centrifugal pumps are illustrated in 
Appendix B) 
 
Failures are defined as the complete or partial lose of function of the equipment. 
Different failure modes on a pump may have different failure mode effects. Some failure 
modes may cause completely loss of the pump’s function, which means the breakdown of 
pump; some may only cause the partial loses of its function, for example the reduction of 
the pump’s transportation capability, or leakage. On the other hand, as the pumps’ 
functions are different, the same failure modes on different pumps may have different 
effects to the system. For example, the water injection pump’s function is to improve the 
well’s production rate by maintaining the pressure of the reservoir, therefore, the 
breakdown and fail to start on demand of this pump can cause the reduction of production 
rate.  But on the contrary, the fire-fighting pump is safety-related equipment but not 
production-related equipment, therefore, its breakdown and fail to start on demand can 
not effect the production of the system. But, they can lead to the potential risk of a fire 
accident. Another illustration is the different effects of leakages on the water injection 
pump and the oil processing pump. The oil processing pump’s function is to drive the 
liquid flow in processing system. The leakage of oil processing pump may lead to the loss 
of oil products. But since the process medium in water injection pump is water, it will not 
effect the production. 
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Table 6.5 failure causes and failure effects of pumps 
 
Taxonomic 
code Failure Modes Failure causes 
Effects on 
production Effects on HSE 
Breakdown Suction of foreign 
objects, damage to 
impeller, bearing 
breakdown, internal 
damage 
Stop water injection, 
reduction of oil 
production 
No  
External leakage-
process medium 
Mechanical failures 
(general, sealing, 
bearing, shafts) 
Normally has no 
effects on production 
Leakage of water, 
no effects on HSE 
External leakage-
utility medium 
Bearing breakdown, 
internal damage 
Normally has no 
effects on production 
Effects on 
environment 
PU-CE-WI 
Fail to start on 
demand 
Instrument failure Stop water injection, 
reduction of oil 
production 
No  
Breakdown Suction of foreign 
objects, damage to 
impeller, bearing 
breakdown, internal 
damage 
Stop oil 
transportation, 
reduction of O & G 
production 
 No  
External leakage-
process medium 
Mechanical failures 
(general, sealing, 
bearing, shafts) 
20 m3 oil leakage, but 
only 2 m3 spill into 
the sea 
Pollution to 
environment, 
potential of fire 
External leakage-
utility medium 
Bearing breakdown, 
internal damage 
Normally has no 
effects on production 
Pollution to 
environment, 
potential of fire 
PU-CE-OP 
Fail to start on 
demand 
Instrument failure Stop oil 
transportation, 
reduction of O & G 
production 
No  
External leakage-
process medium 
Mechanical failures 
(general, sealing, 
bearing, shafts) 
No Potential risk in 
fire-fighting 
External leakage-
utility medium 
Bearing breakdown, 
internal damage 
No  No  
PU-CE-FF 
Fail to start on 
demand 
Instrument failure No  Potential risk in 
fire-fighting 
6.4.3 Assess the risk values of the failure modes 
In order to facilitate the calculation, we do the following assumption: Oil price: 50 
USD/bbl, that is 2062,5NOK/m3; 1 USD = 6,5 NOK; the manhour cost of repaire is 500 
NOK/h; the average cost of spare material(include the costs of purchasing spare parts, 
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repair tools, and all the other material consumption) is 10,000 NOK/time; the clean-up 
cost and fine cost of oil leakage is totally 1,4MNOK/tone, that is 1,2MNOK/m3. 
 
The equations of calculation are shown as following: 
• Downtime loss = Activity repair time * production rate 
• Repair cost = cost of spare material + man-hour cost * man-hour 
• Clean-up and fine cost of oil leakage = 0,12 MNOK/m3 * volume of oil spill 
• Oil lost cost = oil price * volume of leakage 
 
Thus, the total risk values of the failure modes are the following: 
 
Table 6.6 Total risk values of failure modes 
 
Consequence loss 
Economic Loss (MNOK) 
Tax. code FM Sever. Class 
Frequency 
(106 hours) Downtime 
loss 
 
Repair cost  
Clean-up 
and fine cost 
of oil 
leakage 
oil 
lost 
cost 
Total risk 
value 
(MNOK/ 
year) 
Breakdown Critical 0.93 0,825 0,014     0,006844 
Critical 11.47 
  0,036     0,003622 External 
leakage-P Degrade  
          
Critical 3.27 
  0,0252     0,000723 External 
leakage-U Degrade 11.22 
  0,0367     0,003612 
Critical 13.76 11,7975 0,0417     1,429012 
PU-CE-
WI 
Fail to start on 
demand Degrade 37.36 3,5475 0,02285     1,170073 
Breakdown Critical 4.96 
          
Critical 66.25 
  0,0156 0,24 0,041 0,172512 External 
leakage-P Degrade  
          
Critical 
 
       External 
leakage-U Degrade 93.14 
 0,0379   0,030965 
Critical 7.18 
 0,013   0,000819 
PU-CE-
OP 
Fail to start on 
demand Degrade  
       
Critical 
 
       External 
leakage-P Degrade 25.8 
 0,011   0,002489 
Critical 
 
       External 
leakage-U Degrade 372.7 
 0,0171   0,055905 
Critical 31.38 
 0,0164   0,004514 
PU-CE-
FF 
Fail to start on 
demand Degrade 49.37 
 0,01325   0,005738 
6.4.4 Maintenance activities against the failure modes  
In the following discussion, we implement a group of maintenance activities on the three 
different pumps. The purpose of doing this is to illustrate the deviations of values due to 
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implement the same maintenance activity on different pumps, see table 6.7.  
 
Since the vibration control is an online maintenance activity, the cost includes: the cost of 
implementing the vibration monitoring, the cost of corrective or preventive maintenance, 
and the man-hour cost. On contrary, the loop test is an off-line maintenance activity; 
therefore, beside the same costs as the vibration control, it also includes the production 
loss due to the shutdown of process. 
 
Table 6.7 Maintenance activities against failure modes 
 
 
Taxonomic 
code Failure Modes 
Maint. 
activity Description of maint. 
Cost of 
maint. 
(MNOK/Y) 
Breakdown Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
External leakage-
process medium 
Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
External leakage-
utility medium 
Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
PU-CE-WI 
Fail to start on 
demand 
Loop test PAS test every 24 month, 1 
hour shutdown  
0.21 
Breakdown Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
External leakage-
process medium 
Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
External leakage-
utility medium 
Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
PU-CE-OP 
Fail to start on 
demand 
Loop test PAS test every 24 month, 1 
hour shutdown 
2.68 
External leakage-
process medium 
Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
0.001 
External leakage-
utility medium 
Vibration 
control 
Online vibration monitoring 
and maintenance every 3 
month 
 
0.001 
PU-CE-FF 
Fail to start on 
demand 
Loop test PAS test every 24 month, 1 
hours shutdown 
0.001 
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6.4.5 Identify the value of maintenance activity 
According to the definition, “The value of maintenance activity is the benefit we can 
obtain from a maintenance activity”, the value of maintenance activity = the risk value 
saved from the failures due to a maintenance activity is not performed – the cost of the 
maintenance activity, where, the vibration control is used to prevent the failure modes of 
breakdown, external leakage (process and utility), so the risk values that the vibration 
control can save are the sum of the two failure modes.  
 
The values of maintenance activities on the three pumps are shown on the following 
table: 
 
Table 6.8 Value of maintenance activity 
 
Taxonomic 
code 
Maintenance 
activity 
Saved risk 
values Cost of activity 
Contr. of maint. 
(MNOK/Y) 
Vibration control 0.015 0.001 0.014 
PU-CE-WI 
Loop test 2.600 0.21 2.39 
Vibration control 0.203 0.001 0.202 
PU-CE-OP 
Loop test 0.0008 2.68 -2.68 
Vibration control 0.058 0.001 0.057 
PU-CE-FF 
Loop test 0.011 0.001 0.01 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis. Some aspects of the findings are 
discussed. Furthermore, the conclusions and the contributions of the research are 
discussed.  
7.1 Findings from the case study 
The case study finally brings out a very interesting finding to us: when we implement the 
same maintenance actions on the pumps with same type but different functions, the 
results can be very different. Recall the result shown in Table 5.8, the value of loop test is 
2.39 MNOK/Y to water injection pump, but is – 2.68MNOK/Y to oil processing pump. 
The result reveals that the loop test, which is important to water injection pump, is not so 
suitable for oil processing pump. 
 
From the new finding, we can get such conclusion that the equipment’s function, 
location, and working environment are very important determine matters to the value of 
maintenance activities. When we make maintenance strategy, these factors should be well 
considered.  
 
The reason why the values of maintenance activities are so different is that the 
equipment’s function, location, and working environment determine what the dominate 
failure modes are and how serious they are. On the one hand, the equipment’s function 
determines the consequences of failures. Failures represent the loss of the functions. 
Equipments’ dominate failure modes various from each other as their main functions are 
different. For example, the water injection pump’s main function is to improve the well’s 
production rate by maintaining the pressure of the reservoir. Therefore, the failures of 
water injection pump can affect the oil production. The fire-fighting pump’s main 
function is fire-fighting. Therefore, its breakdown may lead to a fire accident. Another 
illustration is the different effects of leakages on the water injection pump and the oil 
processing pump. And, the oil processing pump’s main function is to transport 
hydrocarbon or chemical liquid. Its breakdown will affect the oil processing, and the 
leakage of oil processing pump may bring about environment and safety risks. On the 
other hand, the equipment’s function, location, and working environment affect the 
frequency of failures. The most obvious example is the comparison between oil 
processing pump and water injection pump. The main task of oil processing pump is to 
transport hydrocarbon or chemical liquid, and the work environment is strong corrosive; 
but the water used to extinguish the fire must be pure water. Therefore, oil processing 
pump is much easier to have corrosion than water injection pump, and its frequency of 
leakage is almost 23 times higher than the water injection pump’s. On the contrary, the 
water injection pump’s function is to inject water into oil reservoir, so that it needs to 
generate very high pressure. In this condition, the pump driver must be supplied by high 
electrical loads. But, the situation of oil processing pump is just opposite. Therefore, the 
water injection pump’s frequency of not start on demand is much higher than the oil 
processing pump. Different dominate failure modes and different failure severities 
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correspondingly determine the difference of the value of maintenance activities. 
7.2 Benefit of the methodology 
The benefit of this quantitative assessing method may be the followings: 
 
1) Provide an intuitional and precise approach to for criticality analysis. As a risk based 
method, it assesses the maintenance action through risk values. Therefore, whilst we get 
the value of maintenance actions, we get the risk value of failures, too. Since these values 
are numerical, we can easily and accurately know which failure modes are more critical 
than others, and which maintenance activity will contribute the most to the equipment.  
 
2) Facilitate maintenance management. This method provides a useful decision-making 
tool to the maintenance management process. As we can clearly know the criticalities of 
maintenance activities from this method, the decision-making process in maintenance 
planning, or in maintenance strategy alteration will became very simply. And it is also 
helpful for people to make a corrective decision. 
 
3) Improve the effectiveness of maintenance activities. For maintenance, effectiveness 
can represent the overall company satisfaction with the capacity and condition of its 
assets, or the reduction of the overall company cost obtain because production capacity is 
available when needed (Márquez, 2007). By evaluating the costs we spend on the 
maintenance and the benefits we could get from the maintenance, we could find out the 
most effective maintenance strategy which can meet the company’s requirement on 
production optimization and cost reduction. 
7.3 Practical application 
As we mentioned before, in the maintenance management process, there are two very 
important steps. The first one is the maintenance program planning, which concerns the 
effectiveness of the maintenance program. The other one is the feedback step, which 
include feedback analysis and improvement measure. This step concerns the continuous 
improvement of maintenance management. Both the two steps are decision-making 
process which needs to do cooperation based on the value of maintenance activities. The 
quantitative assess method we developed in this paper provides a very useful decision-
making tool to the maintenance management. It can be widely used in maintenance 
planning and maintenance optimization. By applying this method, we are able to evaluate 
if our maintenance plan is effective and cost efficient. Furthermore, it can 
suggest/propose ways to improve the value assessment of failure consequences. 
7.3.1 Application to maintenance planning 
According to EN 13306:2001, the maintenance plan consists of a “structured set of tasks 
that include activities, procedures, resources and the time scale required to carry out 
maintenance”. Actually, maintenance planning is the maintenance management activity 
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that is carried out to choose which maintenance strategy should be use. When different 
types of maintenance tasks are possible, the factual values of these tasks need to be 
evaluated. 
 
By applying the quantitative method, we can establish a database, in which the most 
common and critical failure modes for equipment, the maintenance activities against the 
failure modes, and the values of these activities are included. When we make 
maintenance plan, we only need to adopt the manufacturers’ recommendations, analysis 
the unique environmental condition and working requirement of particular equipment, 
and based on these considerations, choose the critical failure modes and possible 
maintenance activities from the database. Finally, determine the best group of 
maintenance activities which has the biggest value, and this may be the best maintenance 
strategy. Thus, the framework of maintenance planning could be: 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Maintenance planning model 
 
7.3.2 Application to maintenance optimization 
As the high demands on effective maintenance in industry, many researchers are now 
joining in the studies for maintenance optimization. As S. Apeland and T. Aven (2000) 
pointed, there can be various types of method to establish optimization modes, but all 
tools are for balancing costs and benefits. By evaluating the relationship between costs 
and benefits associated with each maintenance alternative, the optimal strategies can be 
determined (Apeland & Aven, 2000). The value of maintenance activity is just used to 
evaluate the relationship between costs and benefits. 
 
In the maintenance optimization, we can use the value of maintenance activity as a 
measure, and try to find the best way which can maximize it. The maintenance 
optimization can be realized from 3 dimensions: 
Manufacturer’s 
recommendations 
Choose the critical failure 
modes from database 
Choose possible maintenance 
activities from database 
Determine the best group of 
maintenance activities 
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1) Choose the better maintenance activity. In most times, the reason why the 
effectiveness of maintenance activity is very low is that, the maintenance activity we 
chose is improper, or is not the most suitable. In this case, the solution is to change a 
better maintenance activity which has larger value. 
 
2) Improve the inherent effectiveness of the individual maintenance activity. The 
inherent effectiveness is determined by the internal factors of the maintenance activity. 
Let’s recall the equation of value of maintenance activity: Value of maintenance activity= 
total saved risk value – total costs of maintenance, where, total costs of maintenance= 
the maintenance frequency * the cost of maintenance activity. Therefore, the first method 
to improve inherent effectiveness is to reduce the cost of maintenance activity, and the 
second one is to make sue the maintenance frequency as the same with failure frequency 
as possible. The equation of value of maintenance activity can be used to identify the best 
maintenance frequency. 
 
3) Optimize the arrangement of maintenance activities. Normally, we use a group of 
maintenance activities on equipment, but not a single maintenance activity. Therefore, the 
maintenance effect is a kind of synergy of all the maintenance activities. The arrangement 
of maintenance activities may influence the effectiveness of maintenance. For example, 
the effectiveness may be reduced due to the overlapping of two maintenance activities 
against the same failure mode. This will be discussed in future research. 
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8 SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The quantitative method to assess the value of maintenance activity establishes a good 
foundation for the research of maintenance management. As a master thesis project, the 
study is limited by the time. Further and more detailed researches are suggested to be 
done in the following areas: 
 
1) Effectiveness of individual maintenance activity. In this paper, for theoretical study, 
we did not consider the effectiveness of maintenance activity. But, as we know, in real 
industry, the effectiveness of maintenance activity is a very important factor that we 
cannot ignore. In reality, the actual value of maintenance activity is the product of the 
ideal value and its effectiveness. Therefore, it is interesting to study the effectiveness of 
individual. 
 
2) The arrangement of maintenance activities. As we discussed before, how to optimize 
the arrangement of maintenance activities could be an interesting area, and may need 
more considerations. 
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Appendix A: Work sheet for assessing the contribution of maintenance activities 
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Appendix B: Possible causes of centrifugal pumps problems  
(Source: Pump handbook Karassik, Igor J. 2000) 
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